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Book Reviews
C. Ian Kyer and Jerome E. Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A.
Wrigh, the Benchers and Legal Education in Ontario 1923-1957.
University of Toronto Press, 1987. ISBN 0-8020-3986-3. Price $40.00.
In the dozen years after the end of the Second World War, long-standing
conflicts about the nature of education for the legal profession in Ontario
became especially acute. Fortunately, climax and successful compromise
came in 1957. In that year the Law Society of Upper Canada, which had
controlled legal education and admission to practice from the early days
of the Colony of Upper Canada, gave up its monopoly of legal education
and conceded an equal position in this respect to Ontario universities
willing and able to enter the field. Several were, and promptly did so.
Indeed the University of Toronto was already there. For many decades it
had been teaching law, but the Law Society refused proper recognition to
the University of Toronto law degrees for purposes of admission to the
legal profession in the Province.
Under the compromise agreement of 1957, the Law Society continued
its own separate school, the Osgoode Hall Law School, as in effect a
university law school, with the same power to grant the degree of LL.B.
as that just assured to certain of the Ontario universities, including of
course the University of Toronto. A standard full-time three-year
curriculum was agreed upon for the degree of LL.B. After the degree,
wherever obtained, the Law Society then required for all graduates a year
of full-time service in a law office, followed by several months of a
practice-oriented Bar Admission Course given by the Law Society itself
at Osgoode Hall in Toronto. Certain examinations were based on this last
period of instruction and success in them completed requirements for
admission to the Bar of Ontario. This seems a relatively straightforward
result, but it was a very long time in coming in Canada's most wealthy
and populous province.
The various roots of present day legal education for Ontario, and
equally for the other Provinces of Canada, go back to earlier times in the
history of England, France and the United States of America. Until the
publication in 1987 of the book here under review, we have been without
a thorough, systematic and scholarly account of these roots, and of how
they nourished and shaped modem controversies and developments in
Canadian legal education. Now, we do indeed have just such an account,
thanks to the joint efforts of C. Ian Kyer and Jerome E. Bickenbach. This
is one of the most valuable features of their book.
Who are the authors, and how did they come to write this book? They
answer themselves in their Preface:
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"This book is the product of chance discoveries, happy coincidences, and
a working partnership. When Ian Kyer came to the University of Toronto
Law School in 1977, he felt he was leaving his historical pursuits behind.
When Jerome Bickenbach entered the School the next year, he too feared
that he would have little time to think or write about the philosophy of
law. Though we had both earned doctorates in our respective disciplines
[history and philosophy], we turned to law because employment prospects
seemed so much better there." [Preface - ix]
Kyer and Bickenbach were interested in the compromise of 1957 of
which they were beneficiaries. Also, their interest was stimulated when
by chance they discovered in odd comers and closets of the University of
Toronto Law Buildings several boxes containing files which turned out to
be the accumulated papers of Cecil Augustus Wright, for the period
1927-57. Dr. Wright was a brilliant scholar, having graduated in Arts
from the University of Western Ontario and later from the Osgoode Hall
Law school, with the gold medal for heading the class each time. He then
went on to graduate work at the Harvard Law School and secured his
doctorate. He was hired as a teacher at the Osgoode Hall Law School in
1927, and continued to teach law in Ontario until his death in 1967, but
not at the Osgoode Hall Law School the whole time. Though he was
made dean there in March of 1948, he had a confrontation shortly after
with the Benchers of the Law Society. At this juncture he resigned and
moved to the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto where he was
made dean. For the thirty years from 1927 to 1957 Wright was the chief
and most aggressive advocate of the reform of legal education in Ontario.
He wanted, for Ontario and for Canada, what he called "an honest to
God law school", on the model afforded by Harvard University Law
School, with the students in full-time attendance for three academic
years. At the Law Society's Osgoode Hall Law School, students were
very much part-timers at law school lectures, spending most of their days
in service at Toronto law offices.
In this crusade, Dr. Wright had allies and enemies. Incidentally, he was
never called "Cecil"; to friends and foes alike he soon became known as
"Caesar". His principal opponents were the Benchers of the Law Society
of Upper Canada. They were elected by their fellow lawyers in Ontario
as the governing body of the profession, and were themselves
distinguished and able lawyers in practice. Moreover, most of them were
deeply convinced that the best way to train students for the practice of
law was as apprentices for most of the day in the law offices of Toronto.
The Benchers controlled the Osgoode Hall Law School and hired the
very few law teachers who did lecture there to the students early in the
morning and late in the afternoon. The Benchers also controlled
conditions for admission to the Bar of Ontario. Their model was the
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traditional and contemporary system of legal education in England,
centred as it was on the apprenticeship of students in the chambers of
practicing barristers (the Inns of Court) and the offices of practicing
solicitors.
The Kyer-Bickenbach book puts the Harvard-Osgoode differences in a
broad context, and there are three main features to the perspective the
authors thus provide. In the first place they give us a penetrating
biography of Caesar Wright in all aspects of his professional life - as
scholar, writer and teacher of law and as law school administrator.
Donald Creighton, a great Canadian historian, has said that history is the
story of the encounter between character and circumstances. Caesar
Wright is the principal character of this story. Secondly, as I have already
said, the authors provide in thoughtful detail a unique comparative
historical account of the development of legal education in England,
France, the United States of America, and British North America before
and after Confederation in 1867. Here is the broad background of
circumstances to which Creighton alluded. Finally, the authors trace in
detail the specific differences and developments in the period 1927-57
between Caesar Wright and his allies on the one hand and the Ontario
Benchers on the other hand. In Creighton's terms, this was the encounter
leading finally to the compromise of 1957. It is not possible or desirable
to rehearse all the details of the thirty-year contest between Caesar
Wright and the Benchers. The authors do this with great care, but it takes
up half the book. Also, they identify and explain the nature of the main
issues concerning legal education, and this does warrant a reviewer's
attention.
On the one hand, the Benchers and their supporters preferred the
apprenticeship system, the main feature of which was the daily
employment of students in Toronto law offices, with some lectures at the
Osgoode Hall Law School for an hour or so at the beginning and the end
of each day. In fact the law office tasks took most of the students' time,
and their attention to lectures was quite secondary. Moreover, the
Osgoode Hall Law School stood almost alone in Canada as a
professional school governed by the Law Society. It was not part of a
general institution of higher learning as were the law faculties of major
universities like Harvard. In them the law students gave full-time
attention to their studies and their professors for three co-ordinated
academic years. Nevertheless, the Benchers were confident that their way
was best, following as it did the manner in which barristers and solicitors
were qualified in England. Caesar Wright had experienced the Benchers'
system and had indeed done very well at it. But then his time at Harvard
convinced him that the university way was definitely superior to the
Osgoode way.
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Historically, as the authors point out, there is a paradox about the
English example. Famous English legal scholars had been speaking out in
favour of University-centered legal education for admission to practice
since the eighteenth century. Their voices were heard in the United States
of America and what they advocated came to prevail there. But to this
day the English legal profession adheres to the apprenticeship system
separate and apart from the English universities for purposes of
qualification to practice as a barrister or a solicitor.
The English voice heard most clearly in America was that of Sir
William Blackstone, who started teaching English law at Oxford in 1753.
(Before this, only Roman Law was taught at Oxford.) Over the next few
years, Blackstone's lectures were expanded and published as his famous
"Commentaries on the Laws of England". More copies of them were sold
in the British American Colonies (soon to become the independent
United States) than were sold in England herself.
Kyer and Bickenbach summarize and comment upon Blackstone's
views on legal education as follows:
In the first volume of his Commentaries, Blackstone strongly criticized
the apprenticeship approach to legal education. He found it astonishing
that an area of knowledge of such importance was not taught
systematically. The notion that students could acquire knowledge of the
law in the service of an attorney or barrister Blackstone dismissed as
ludicrous: 'If practice be the whole he is taught, practice must also be the
whole he will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the elements and first
principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, the least variation
from established precedents will totally distract and bewilder him.' How,
Blackstone asked, could we allow the interpretation and enforcement of
the law that vitally affects our property, liberty, and lives to fall into the
hands of illiterate men? The only hope for the profession, he argued, was
to make an academic education a prerequisite to legal study, and to make
legal study part of a university education.
Blackstone's views on the nature and aims of legal education formed the
basic creed of those who were to argue for the university law school for
the next three centuries: law can be systematically taught, not merely as a
body of practical rules but as a science; as a science, law can be taught only
in a university setting surrounded by teachers and students of the other
sciences. This being so, the argument went, professional law teachers must
be skilled both in the practice of the law and in the science of the law and
what we would regard today as the kindred social sciences. In addition,
legal education needed a literature, the product of specialized legal
scholars able to assess and recommend changes in the law. As we shall see,
the university setting, the professionalization of legal academics, and the
development of legal scholarship formed the core of demands made by the
crusaders for university law schools.
Blackstone's aspirations for legal education for 'gentlemen of all ranks
and degrees' came to an abrupt end in 1766. Exasperated by the
conservatism of the legal profession, itself mostly untrained in the learned

The Fiercest Debate

study of the law and unconvinced of the need for such training, Blackstone
resigned his post at Oxford. The system of office apprenticeship continued,
and, in England at least, the only marks left by Blackstone were the
volumes of his Commentaries,which the student simply added to the short
list of books he was required to master on his own. (p. 8-9)
Concerning Blackstone's influence in America, our authors quote the
Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer, speaking to the American
Bar Association in 1895. "We, in America, have carried legal education
much farther than it has gone in England. There the systematic teaching
of law in schools is but faintly developed. Here it is elaborate, widely
favoured, rapidly extending. Why is this? Not because we originated this
method. We transplanted our English root, and nurtured and developed
it, while at home it was suffered to languish and die down". (p. 13)
Surveying legal education in the various Provinces of Canada after
Confederation, we find that while Ontario had followed the English
apprenticeship system, Nova Scotia followed the university model. The
Dalhousie University Law School, founded in 1883, with the full support
of the provincial Bench and Bar, followed the example afforded by
Harvard in nearby New England. Likewise, in 1892, the Bench and Bar
of Saint John, New Brunswick, established a three-year full-time law
school in that city as part of the provincial university. Moving west to
Quebec, we find that, from about the middle of the Nineteenth Century,
law schools were part of the Universities. This was so in France and
continental Europe generally, and the civil law of Quebec was French.
Hence the University model was followed in the cases of the Universities
of Laval, McGill and Montreal. In the 1920's and 1930's between World
War I and World War II, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta founded
law schools as parts of their respective provincial universities, as did
British Columbia just after World War II. West of the Great Lakes, the
Dalhousie-Harvard model prevailed.
However, the contrast between the Osgoode Hall Law School and the
university law schools should not be too sharply drawn, important
though it was. Until after World War II, there were very few full-time
law teachers at each of the university law schools or at Osgoode. Many
if not most of the subjects were taught by practicing lawyers and judges
from the city where the law school was located. The few full-time
professors taught the remaining subjects, carrying heavy teaching loads in
so doing. Except for Osgoode Hall, the teachers, whether part-time or
full-time, did have the opportunity to educate full-time students in a
university context.
Also, in the Provinces with university law schools, practical training by
service in law offices was not neglected. A period of it was required by
the respective provincial legal professions, and frequently some final Bar
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examinations as well, before admission. But, such apprenticeship was not
concurrent with the university academic years. As our authors tell us,
Caesar Wright was not opposed to practical training as such, but he was
against the Osgoode concurrency.
Wright was realistic enough to know that the complete abandonment of
practical training would never be acceptable to the Canadian law societies.
Moreover, he was strongly of the opinion that legal education could not
ignore practice completely. Ironically, despite the prevailing belief among
the benchers that Wright was wholly academically minded, he was not a
true academic in the sense of being a detached theoretician. He was not a
deep, abstract thinker, but rather a pragmatic, practice-oriented teacher
fully convinced of the necessity of practical training. His primary goal was
to expose students to rigorous and socially relevant legal training
uninterrupted by their law-office apprenticeship. Although he acknowledged the value of practical training, Wright thought that the
apprenticeship scheme was a failure. In addition, he was greatly concerned
that Canada was not producing legal writing of any sustaining value, and
believed that only legal academics, devoting their full time to teaching and
research, could fill that glaring need. (160-61)
When Wright became dean of the Osgoode Hall Law School in 1948,
he had reasonable grounds to believe that the Benchers would agree to
changes making Osgoode in effect a university law school. But it was not
to be, not yet. On January 20, 1949, the Benchers, in confidential session,
rejected Wright's proposed full-time law school and fully re-affirmed the
concurrent system. Wright first learned of this the next day when he read
the press release about it in the Toronto newspapers, as did the other fulltime members of the Osgoode teaching staff - namely, Bora Laskin,
John Willis and Stanley Edwards. All four of them submitted their
resignations forthwith, and held a press conference to announce them.
Very public and very bitter controversy then ensued.
On March 10, the University of Toronto announced that Wright,
Willis and Laskin were joining the University's law faculty, and that
Wright was to succeed WP.M. Kennedy as the dean there, Kennedy
being ready to retire. Sidney Smith, the President of the University of
Toronto, was a former dean of the Dalhousie Law School. Both he and
Kennedy were very much on Wright's side and against the Benchers'
position of discrimination against University of Toronto law graduates.
Thus, the Law Society found itself facing the school year 1949-50
without a dean or any full-time professors for the Osgoode Hall Law
School. Nevertheless, in time for September, 1949, they managed to hire
the Dean of the University of Birmingham faculty of Law, C.E. SmalleyBaker. Smalley-Baker was a Canadian, and brought with him a very able
English member of the Birmingham law faculty, David L. Smout. In
1950, full-time staff of the Osgoode Law School was brought up to
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strength with the appointment of two more highly qualified Canadians,
H. Allan Leal and Donald B. Spence.
There was some reduction in the concurrency of apprenticeship with
lectures made in the Osgoode School system, but much of it remained,
and University of Toronto graduates continued to face an extra year
compared to Osgoode graduates in achieving admission to the Bar. For
a time, the Benchers remained intransigent about conceding anything to
the University of Toronto, and deadlock continued.
But, soon the future changed in favour of university legal education,
due to emerging new factors beyond the control of the old contending
parties. The authors tell this story in their Chapter 10, entitled "The Road
to Compromise". In Ontario after World War II it became apparent that
there would be an enormous increase in the demand for legal education
as part of greatly expanded enrollments for higher education generally.
The necessity for much increased public finance of this, both capital and
current, was evident. Osgoode Hall Law School was a private monopoly
professional school whose sources of revenue were student fees and fees
paid by practicing lawyers to the Law Society of Upper Canada. The
simple fact was that the Law Society alone could not afford to maintain
their monopoly of legal education and meet the legitimate demand for
legal education that was building in Ontario. Nor could the Government
of Ontario be expected to finance the Law Society's monopoly school
with public funds, especially when there were grave and public doubts
about the merit of the Osgoode system anyway. If the Osgoode Hall Law
School was to survive and to share in public finance, it would have to be
as one law school among several in the Province. Only the University of
Toronto and some of the other Ontario universities could provide those
other law schools.
But, the few other universities in Ontario which were interested could
not be expected to cooperate unless there was a new deal, as the
University of Toronto people had been insisting there should be. There
had to be a level playing field. It could not be made level for the
newcomers unless the discrimination against the University of Toronto
law graduates was terminated. Moreover, the interested universities
would not accept the concurrency of office apprenticeship and teaching
that was the heart of the Law Society's system. So, at last, such
concurrency was doomed. As the authors tell us: "Pushed finally by the
fiscal realities of modem mass education, the Benchers decided that it was
time to assess the possible role of the universities in legal education in
Ontario" (249). They took the initiative, and a special committee of
Benchers met with representatives of the Ontario universities. The date
was April 30, 1955. The negotiations continued to a fruitful result, about
two years later.
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For all the details, read the book. Suffice it to say here that the details
amount to a fascinating lesson in negotiation and diplomacy. The
compromise agreement outlined at the start of this review was reached
and ratified by all parties by February 15, 1957. In ordinary
circumstances, the President and Dean of Law of the University of
Toronto would have led the negotiation on behalf of the universities, but
the circumstances were not ordinary. By 1955, relations between Caesar
Wright and the Benchers were very bitter, and the latter were also
dubious about Sidney Smith. However, Queen's University was quite
firm in its desire to have a law faculty on the Harvard model as soon as
possible, and had not been involved in the Toronto controversy. So, the
managers of the negotiations for the interested Ontario universities were,
by agreement, WA. Mackintosh and J.A. Corry, respectively the
Principal and Vice Principal of Queen's. Caesar Wright and Sidney
Smith trusted them, and so did their counterparts in the other universities
concerned. So, also, did the Benchers of the Law Society, headed by Cyril
Carson, Q.C. Moreover, J.A. Corry had been a professor of law at the
University of Saskatchewan for ten years before he came to Queen's as
professor of political science in 1936.
The compromise agreement was worked out in detail by three people:
Alex Corry for the universities; and John Arnup and Park Jamieson, two
of the leading benchers of the Law Society. They met for the purpose in
the Royal York Hotel, Toronto, on January 18 and 19, 1957. When
Corry phoned Caesar Wright on January 19 to give him news of what
had been agreed, Wright could hardly believe his ears. After his thirty
years of advocacy, crusade and controversy, at last the university model
for law schools was to be followed for legal education in Ontario.
The fruits of the Law Society of Upper Canada - Ontario
Universities Agreement came quickly. Osgoode Hall Law School
converted to the new basis forthwith, and the University of Toronto Law
School immediately became more attractive to applicants. In September,
1957, Queen's University opened a law school, and in the same year the
University of Ottawa did likewise, adding a Common Law side to its law
faculty which was already teaching the Civil Law of Quebec. In
September, 1959, the University of Western Ontario Law School started
operations. In 1967, the University of Windsor established a law faculty.
On July 1, 1968, the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
officially came into existence. This was the transfer of the three academic
years of the Law Society's school to York University as the latter's faculty
of law. The Bar Admission Course for all Ontario universities remained
downtown under the Law Society's auspices in accordance with the
agreement of 1957.
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Also, the agreement of 1957 was in time to facilitate Ontario's full
participation in a great increase in numbers of full-time law teachers in
Canada involving all Canadian university law schools. In Ontario in
1950, there were ten full-time teachers of law. As 1990 opens, the six
Ontario law schools have a total of 250 full-time professors. Most of the
curriculum planning and teaching is in their hands. Nevertheless, over
200 practicing lawyers and judges still function in Ontario as part-time
teachers in the law schools. The picture is generally the same in the other
Provinces.
All those interested in the history, nature and quality of legal education
in our country owe a vote of thanks to C. Ian Kyer and Jerome E.
Bickenbach. And the same people owe it to themselves to read this book.
WR. Lederman, O.C., Q.C., ER.S.C.,
Professor Emeritus,
Queen's University.
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Jutta Brunnre, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion InternationalLaw
and Regulation, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1988. 302 pp.
Although international customary and conventional law have addressed
aspects of transfrontier pollution problems for decades,' the regional and
global environmental degradations which have come to the forefront in
the 1980s and 1990s - acid rain, ozone depletion, and global warming,
to name but three - represent new challenges to existing international
law institutions and concepts. In a sense, the world has over the past two
centuries gone through a period of what could be called "technological
adolescence", as individuals and corporations, largely from industrialized
nations, exploited the earth's resources with little if any concern for the
immediate and long-term implications of their actions. In the face of evermounting and ominous evidence of the seriously ill health of the planet,
there has been growing recognition that there are limits to what the earth
can provide as well as responsibilities associated with the use of its
resources. The as yet unanswered question is whether the structures and
concepts of international law developed to this point are or will be
adequate to contend with the serious threats to the world's environment
which lie ahead.
Jutta Brunn6e's book Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion:
InternationalLaw and Regulation2 could be described as an attempt to
answer this question by examining legal treatment of the two most
significant forms of long range transboundary air pollutants (LRTAP)
which have arisen to date. Originally a thesis prepared at Dalhousie Law
School, Brunnre's text follows in the footsteps of a similar, earlier
Dalhousie Law School effort, van Lier's InternationalLaw and Acid
3
Rain, published in 1981.
After making a detailed analysis of the international response to acid
rain and ozone depletion up to 1987, Brunnre arrives at a cautiously
optimistic conclusion concerning the ability of contemporary
international legal regimes and concepts to deal with global atmospheric
pollution problems. In essence, her position is that existing rules of
international environmental law provide only broad directions, but
cannot evolve quickly enough or respond with sufficient precision to

1. With respect to customary law, see, for example, the Trail Smelter Arbitration, (1938,
1941) 111 U.N.R.I.A.A., (1949); as to its limitations, see discussion infra For an early example
of treatment of pollution matters in a major multilateral convention, see the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, May 12, 1954.
2. Brunn&, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion:t InternationalLaw and Regulation New
York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1988.

3. Irene van Lier, Acid Rain and InternationalLaw(Toronto: Bunsel, 1981).
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handle problems such as acid rain and ozone depletion.4 What is needed,
according to Brunnre, is a preventive "management approach" to be
added to international environmental law.5 For Brunnre, this approach is
well illustrated by the work of the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP), which resulted in the Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer 6 and the subsequent Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 7 The two approaches - the
reactive, traditional international law system, and the preventive
management modus operandi - are complementary and mutually
reinforcing, since the traditional approach provides the foundation and
framework for the specific management regimes created to respond to
particular environmental problems. 8
In the experience of this reviewer, it is all too often that legalenvironmental commentators, in their haste to delve into detailed analysis
of points of law, leave the reader in the dark by not providing sufficient
background information concerning how the problem originated and
why it developed in a way it did. In reality, legal analysis of complex
issues, such as those surrounding environmental problems, usually only
makes sense in light of this broader context. Brunnre does an excellent
job of bringing the reader "up to speed" by canvassing the historical,
scientific, and economic underpinnings to acid rain and ozone depletion.
Chapter II of the text is devoted to the descriptoin of the scientific
aspects of atmospheric pollution. Here, the reader is made aware of,
among other things, the impacts (and potential impacts) of acid rain and
ozone depletion on human health, lakes, groundwater, fish, soil, forests,
crops, wildlife and structures.' The lack of conclusive evidence
concerning who causes what damage to whom has represented a
practical and legal barrier preventing easy resolution of the problem,
while at the same time providing a convenient excuse for those nations
less enthusiastic about swift clean-up action.' 0 Brunnre observes that up
to half of the current sulphuric emissions are thought to be natural in
origin, a factor which must hamper scientists in their efforts to find parties
responsible for damages." In light of such factors, the 1979 Economic
4. Brunne, supra,note 2, at p. 141.
5. Ibid
6. UNEP/IG 535, March 22, 1985, reprinted in (1987) 26 .L.M. 1516. (hereinafter also
referred to as "the Vienna Convention").
7. UNEP, Final Act, September 16, 1987, reprinted in (1987) 26 .LM. 1541 (hereinafter also
referred to as "the Montreal Protocol").
8. Brunn~e, supra,note 2, at p. 268.
9. bid, at pp. 14-24; 43-47.
10. See further discussion of this in the context of U.S.-Canada acid rain negotiations infra
11. Brunne, supra, note 2, at p. 11.
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Commission of Europe (ECE) Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution12 defines LRTAP as air pollution with origins in one
state and adverse effects in another state "at such a distance that it is not
possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission
sources. ..,13
Here we see an example of how the physical characteristics
of acid precipitation necessitate a move away from the classic
international tort situation where victim and wrongdoer are clearly
discernible (eg., the Trail Smelter 4 incident), in favour of a more
cooperative approach. The difficulty is that as long as some states do not
participate in the cooperative scheme 5 , the likelihood of success is greatly
16
diminished.
In the course of the chapter, a number of interesting and little known
facts about LRTAP are presented. For example, many might not have
been aware that acid rain has been a recognized local phenomenon since
the 1800s, but that its international consequences only became apparent
in the late 1950s.17 In Canada, the construction of the Inco "superstack"
in 1972 in effect transformed a domestic pollution problem into one with
transfrontier dimensions. 8 Emerging from this discussion the reader gains
an appreciation for another distinctive characteristic of much
transfrontier air pollution which makes legal control difficult: there is no
easily discernible line between acceptable and unacceptable LRTAP.
Although, in international law, it is accepted that state responsibility lies
for activities defined as wrongful and therefore subject to prohibition (eg.,
international crimes), the situation is considerably less clear where injury
results from activity not so prohibited. 19
Brunnte also looks at scientific aspects of the ozone problems. In
contrast to the fairly long history and generally well accepted nature of
acid rain, the theory that ozone depletion was caused by certain
manmade chemicals was not even proposed until 1974.20 while the

12. T.I.A.S. No. 10541, Geneva, November 13, 1979, reprinted at (1979) 18 LLM.1442
(hereinaftdr also referred to as "the ECE LRTAP Convention").)
13. Article 1 (b), discussed by Brunn6e, supra, note 2, at pp. 136-137.
14. Trail supra, note 1,discussed in greater detail infra
15. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States have been hold outs, refusing to
sign the sulphur protocol passed pursuant to the ECE LRTAP Convention; discussed in greater
detail by Brunnte, supra, note 2, at p. 185.
16. On this problem, see discussion by Brunne, ibid, at pp. 53-54; see also p. 140.
17. ]bid, at p. 9.
18. ]bid, at p. 13.
19. See, for example, the evolving work of the International Law Commission concerning
"International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law", discussed briefly by Brunne, ibid, at pp. 114-115.
20. /bid,at p. 34.
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phenomenon of ozone depletion and its causes are now widely accepted,
the extent of the long term effects of such ozone depletion are still a
matter of considerable debate. 21 This points to another distinctive
characteristic of some of the new global pollution problems which makes
their legal control difficult: essentially, the international community is
required to respond in advance to future, anticipated damages of a
speculative nature, before they materialize. 22 Again, this supports
Brunnre's basic thesis that a cooperative, management approach must be
undertaken, that a piecemeal response will not be sufficient to address
problems of this magnitude and nature. Moreover, the international
response must be swift: it is estimated that, due to the extremely stable
state of CFC 12 (a major identified ozone depleting chemical) and the
fact that CFCs take years to accumulate in the atmosphere, an immediate
85% reduction in emissions is necessary just to keep current atmospheric
23
ozone concentrations stable.
The third chapter introduces the reader to economic aspects of
environmental protection of the atmosphere. Brunnre does an admirable
job of synthesizing an enormous range of material here, from theoretical
concepts, such as Pareto optimality, market failure, public goods,
externalities, and the polluter pays principle 24, to a more practicallyoriented examination of the costs of pollution control compared to the
costs of environmental damage. 25 Emerging from this discussion is
recognition that it is extremely difficult to attribute specific effects to a
particular pollutant, this in turn making prescription of abatement
measures problematic since the measures adopted might not solve the
problem. Brunnre concludes her remarks on the economic aspects of acid
rain by observing some of the limitations of cost-benefit analysis when
applied to this area: ".... even if the costs for reducing emissions are
higher than those of the damage caused to another country it cannot be
an excuse for causing that damage on another country's territory.
Therefore, what is required is a diplomatic and political rather than an
exclusively economic approach to the transboundary problem." 26 In
effect, then, economic analysis reveals some of the causes for the current
problems, but does not provide the immediate solutions.
Against this backdrop, the international law context as it applies to
acid rain and ozone depletion is explored in Chapter IV. In attempting to
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

]bid, at pp. 43-47.
Observed by Brunnre ibid, at p. 270.
Ibid, at p. 38.
Ibid, at pp. 52-60.
Ibid, at pp. 70-79.
Ibid, at p. 77.
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describe the principles of international law relevant to LRTAP, Brunnfe
has taken on a daunting and complex task. Publicists have devoted their
entire careers (and countless articles) to the articulation and development
of principles of state responsibility and liability pertaining to international
environmental degradations. 27 Some of the fundamental principles at
play here, such as those relating to liability for injurious consequences
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (i.e., as is arguably
the case with cumulative low impact insults to the environment those
causing acid rain and ozone depletion) are still in the process of being
worked out. 28 Brunnfe's basic position is that, by itself, the traditional
approach, with its cause-effect requirements and "rule-infringementresponsibility-remedy" system, lacks the ability to respond with adequate
swiftness and precision to problems such as acid rain and ozone
depletion. 29 It is apparent that Brunnfe's objective in this chapter is to
survey the major international law principles involved in a manner which
lends support to her basic position, and not to portray the current body
of international law from a particularly reform-minded perspective. For
Brunnfe (and for many others), the traditional approach has not in itself
been sufficient to meet the challenge: the future lies in internationally
cooperative activities and agreements which "flesh out" the general rules.
Readers looking for a more aggressive and in-depth assessment of the
prospects of traditional international law concepts to respond to the new
global environment threats would be best advised to examine some of the
many sources Brunnfe cites in her footnotes to the chapter.
Main topics of discussion in the chapter are the substantive 30 and
procedural 3 ' rules of international law applicable to long range
transboundary air pollution, state responsibility, 32 and the use of national
systems.33 After noting the tension produced by the compenting notions
of territorial sovereignty (the right of nations to exploit resources within
their jurisdiction) and integrity (the obligation of nations not to exploit

27. The most notable example is probably Professor Gunther Hand. Major articles by him
include Handi, "Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution," (1975)
69 Am J. Int'l L 50; Handl, "State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental
Damage by Private Persons" (1980) 74 An J Int'l L 525; Handl, "International Liability of
States for Marine Pollution" (1983) Can. YB. Int'l L 85; Handl, "National Uses of
Transboundary Air Resources: The International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered" (1986) 26
Nat Resources J. 405.

28. See footnote 19, supra
29.
30.
31.
32.

Brunn&, supra, at p. 141.
Ibid, at pp. 83-103.
]bid, at pp. 103-112.
Ibid, at pp. 112-121.

33. Ibid, at pp. 124-132.
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their resources in such a manner harmful to others), Brunn6e then
examines the substantive rules applicable. She reduces the major
principles involved in "good neighborliness" 34 and "equitable
35
utilization".
Although aware of the fact that the concept of good neighborliness is
a much broader notion and consequently has more general application
than merely to environmental situations, 36 Brunnre employs it as
shorthand to describe the duty of states to not cause serious damage
beyond their territory. Her concepts of the principle as it pertains to
environmental contexts is based on a combination of sources, from the
Roman law maxim sic utere ut alienum non laedas,37 to the TrailSmelter
arbitrations, 38 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 39 and the
preamble of the U.N. Charter,4° among others. Building on sic utere and
Trail she starts from the initial (and conservative) position that states
cannot cause serious harm to other states. Principle 21 is used by
Brunnre4 ' to broaden this limited state-to-state obligation to the more
comprehensive duty to not cause harm to "areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction". 42 Synthesizing the foregoing with the Corfu
Channel case43 (state obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used contrary to the rights of other states"), the Palmas cases45 (state
obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other states 46) and
the Alabama decision 47 (state obligation to use all due care in the
34. Ibid, at pp. 87-98.
35. Ibid., at pp. 98-103.
36. See. eg., opening discussion at p. 87; at p. 88, Brunnre describes Trail as a decision which
"confirmed and specified the rather broad notion" of good neighborliness; at p. 90 she refers
to good neighborliness as a "general principle" occurring in the preamble to the U.N. Charter
which underscores the determination of states to live together in peace with one another as
good neighbors.
37. Ibid. at p. 87.
38. Trai4 supra, note 1. Brunnre is careful to note its well recognized limitations, such as the
fact that Canada had admitted liability prior to submitting the case to arbitration (see, eg.,
p. 89), but nevertheless relies on it substantially.
39. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in (1972) LLM.1416 (hereinafter referred to as
"Principle 21", and the "the Stockholm Declaration"). Discussed by Brunne at pp. 89-90.
40. See note 36, supra.
41. Brunne is careful to note its limitations - most obviously its non-binding nature, and the
fact that principle 22 indicates a lack of consensus with respect to the question of liability: see
Brunn~e, note 2, supraat pp. 89-92.
42. Ibid, at p. 89; see also at p. 136.
43. (1949) C.J.Reports 4.
44. Brunne, supra, note 2, at pp. 94-95.
45. P.C. Arb. 1928 No. XIX in 2 R.LA.A.
46. Brunnre, supra, note 2, at p. 95.
47. Alabama Claims case summary by P Seidel, Alabama Case in R. Bernhardt, ed.,
Encyclepedia of PublicInternationalLaw, instalment 2 (1983) at 11, 12.
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performance of international obligations48 ), Brunn~e builds a preventive
component into her obligation not to cause environmental harm. 49 She
confirms her formulation by citing a number of examples of treaty
5
provisions and state practices consistent with it. 0
The principle of good neighborliness is of such a broad nature that
some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that it encompasses the
concept of equitable utilization. 5' Although Brunnre loads a great deal
into her version of good neighborliness, she treats equitable utilization as
separate and distinct. The extension of the principle of equitable
utilization from the context in which it was originally articulated (shared
water resources) to regional air sheds (eg., continental acid rain) is
discussed, as are its limitations. 52 Later, Brunn~e notes the particular
relevance of this principle to ozone depletion as an instance of the "global
commons" phenomenon, given that, as with water basins, the ozone layer
has a limited assimilative capacity and discernible boundaries. 3 The
relationship between equitable utilization and the obligation to not cause
significant harm is also examined, with Brunnre concluding that a
utilization which causes significant transboundary harm would be
considered inequitable in the absence of exceptional justifying
circumstances5
Brunn6e relies on the combined principles of "[t]he 'good neighborliness' of nations sharing natural resources" 5 as the well-spring for many
procedural obligations of considerable importance of the problem of long
range air pollution. The obligations of states to cooperate, notify and
inform, consult and negotiate are all surveyed. 56 Brunnre rightly
emphasizes that resolution of the acid rain and ozone depletion problems,
given their magnitude and nature, depends heavily on states fulfilling
57
these procedural obligations.
Determining the appropriate rules of state responsibility applicable to
transboundary pollution has occupied the attention of the international
legal community for many years. Problems arise when attempts are made

48. Brunn&, supra, note 2, at p. 95.

49. Ibid, at pp. 94-96.
50. Ibia, at pp. 96-98.
51. Eg., Goldie, "Development of an International Environmental Law - An Appraisal" in
I. Hargrove, ed., Law, Institutions,and the Global Environment Oceana Publications, Dobbs
Ferry, N.Y., 1972, 104-165 at pp. 130-131.
52. Brunnr&, supra,note 2, at pp. 98-103.
53. Ibid, at p. 140.
54. Ibid, at p. 103; pp 137-138.
55. Ibid, at p. 103.
56. Ibid, at pp. 103-111.
57. Ibid, atp. 138, 140.
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to translate the general obligations to prevent harm into specific and
practicable rules resulting in liability. Thus, while Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration is evidence that state responsibility to avoid
transboundary harm is generally accepted, the same Declaration also
noted that international law regarding liability and compensation for
victims needs to be developed (principle 22).58 Issues yet to be
conclusively resolved, which are discussed by Brunnre, include liability
for acts, such as air pollution, which are not prohibited in international
law, but which nevertheless cause harm, 9 the threshold level of harm
necessary to attract liability, 60 and what standard of liability is
appropriate 6l. Still, the author notes a number of potentially promising
lines of attack: first, as a starting point, there is the long accepted rule
established in the Chorzow Factory case 62 that "the breach of an
engagement, involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate
form". 63 While the precise terms of the "serious harm" threshold are still
debated and thus likely to continue to pose problems in the case of
substantive obligations, 64 Brunnre correctly notes that with respect to
procedural obligations to cooperate, inform and consult "the effects of
LRTAP have crossed the threshold of 'serious impact' activating the duty
65
as such.
In spite of the fact that problems of acid rain and ozone depletion are
quintessentially international in scope, an important role can and has
been played by national legal systems on these types of issues. After
noting the problems associated with use of national courts, Brunnre
discusses the progressive "Nordic Convention",66 which gives any person
located in the contracting state and affected by environmentally harmful
activities of another contracting state the right to bring an action
(including proceedings for compensation for damages) to the same extent
and on the same terms as a legal entity of the state in which the activities
are being carried out.68 The U.S. Clean Air Act 68 - Canadian Clean Air
58. bid, at p. 113.
59. Briefly discussed by Brunnre, ibid., at pp. 114-115.
60. bid, at pp. 115-116, and 136-140.

61. Brunne concludes that, in spite of the move towards strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities, a fault (due diligence) standard is appropriate for LRTAP situations: ibid, at pp. 117119.
62. (1928)PCIJSer. A. No. 17 21.
63. Brunnre,Jbid, at p. 112.
64. Ibid, at p. 116, 136,140, as confirmed by Handl, 1986, supra, note 27, at p. 412.

65. Ibid, at p. 139.
66. 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, reprinted in (1974) 13 LLM.
591.

67. Brunne, supra, at pp. 126-127.
68. 42 U.S.C.
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Act 69 reciprocal treatment provisions, and problems associated therwith
are also summarized. 70
In light of the limitations of the traditional international law approach,
with its broadly worded obligations, its emphasis on serious damage and
causation, as well as its slowly evolving nature, Brunnre concludes that
the existing international law system is inadequate by itself, but provides
the foundation upon which a preventive management approach must be
added.7 In this stance, Brunnre could be accused of exaggerating the
limitations of the existing international law system, and expressing undue
faith in the "management approach": in trhe final analysis, even the
preventive regimes she discusses depend for their proper functioning on
their being clearly established and accepted obligations and rules of
liability. In this respect, some of the more progressive aspects of
international law, such as the ongoing but as yet incomplete work of the
ILC on liability for harm arising from acts not prohibited in international
law and the move towards acceptance of strict liability as the acceptable
standard for cases of environmental harm are perhaps not here given the
attention they deserve.
In Chapter V, the early development of the cooperative, management
LRTAP approach is set out, particularly as it applies to the acid rain
problem. Discussion begins with a description of the United Nations
Environmental Program in the early 1970s, and its use of Action Plans. 72
Also examined are the efforts of regional or limited membership
organizations, including the Council of Europe, OECD, and U.N.'s
Economic Commission for Europe as well as the Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Nordic Council, the European
Economic Community, the various bilateral arrangements. 73 Brunnre's
survey reveals some of the strengths and weaknesses, and varied
institutional responses to LRTAP provided by the international
community. The major subjects of discussion in the chapter are the ECE
LRTAP Convention, 74 and the ongoing Canada-U.S. acid rain
75
negotiations.
The impetus for the 1979 ECE LRTAP Convention are traced back to
a statement made by President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union at

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

S.C. 1970-72, c. 47; now CanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAc4 S.C. 1988, c 22.
Brunn&e, supra, note 2, at pp. 130-132.
Ibid, at p. 141.
Ibid., at pp. 143-149.
Ibid, at pp. 150-223.

74. Ibid, at pp. 175-186.
75. Ibid, at pp. 190-210.
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the 1975 conference, calling for international approaches to the panEuropean problems associated with energy, transport, and the
environment. 76 Norway and Sweden seized on the ECE's unique EastWest membership, and the conference's recommendations for greater
cooperations with respect to fuel desulphurization and control of NOX as
as an opportunity to forge an LRTAP agreement. 77 Negotiations began in
1977, culminating in the adoption of the treaty in 1979 and ratification
in 1982.78
The provisions of the convention are examined in some detail by
Brunn~e. 79 While critical of the lack of hard commitments for action and
innumerable qualifiers contained in the Convention and protocols, she
also provides valuable insights as to why the somewhat motherhood
nature of the Convention was inevitable, given the diversity of interests
and countries represented.80 In spite of its many weaknesses, Brunn~e
views the Convention asa positive contribution toward resolution of the
LRTAP problem, emphasizing in particular the flexibility of the
framework approach for dealing with an issue the subject of scientific
debate and significant economic implications.8 1
The multi-state activities of the ECE which culminated in the LRTAP
conventions and protocols are constructively contrasted by Brunn~e with
the bilateral Canada-U.S. acid rain negotiations.82 That most European
countries are both polluters and victims is described as a fact conducive
of regional cooperation, whereas in the North American situation, the
accepted victim-polluter (i.e., Canada U.S.) relation has made solutions
less obvious. 8 3 On the other hand, the long tradition of cooperation
between Canada and the United States is considered by Brunn~e to be an
84
important motivating factor for negotiated resolution of the problem.
The author analyzes the role of the IJC as a long respected institutional
mechanism used to address Canada-U.S. border resource conflicts.8 5 The
development of the International Joint Commission's role in environmental matters is set out.86 As to why the IJC has not played a central
role in resolution of the acid rain problem, Brunn~e realistically suggests
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid, at p. 76.
Ibid
Ibid., at pp. 176-177.
Ibid, at pp. 177-186.
Ibid, at pp. 184-186.
Ibid
Ibid, at pp. 190-210.
Ibid, at pp. 190-191.
Ibid, at p. 191.
Ibid. at pp. 192-198.
Ibid
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that the ecological, economic and political dimensions of the issue are of
a national scale, and that it is perhaps too much to expect the
governments to relinquish control over such decisions to an independent
87
body.
Negotiations between the two countries outside the IJC framework are
also examined, including the 1978 exchange of notes which established a
research consultation group,88 and the signing of a Memorandum of
Intent in 1980.89 Brunn6e points to the coming into office of the Regan
admiriistration in January 1981 as a turning point in Canada-U.S.
relations over acid rain. 90 U.S. manipulation of the scientists appointed to
the working groups lead to questionable quality of work and criticisms of
its objectivity, eventually resulting in the Americans adopting a
frustrating (for the Canadians) "go slow, more research needed"
position.91 When negotiations subsequently broke down, Canada began
unilateral reductions.92 In a continuing effort to reduce some of the
scientific uncertainty, in 1983 a tracer experiment agreement was signed
between the two countries,93 and in 1985 special envoys were appointed
by the respective governments, 94 who recommended (among other
things) a multi-million dollar commercial technology demonstration
program in the U.S.95 Brunn6e's account of the development of the
management approach to address the acid rain problem amply
demonstrates that behind every bilateral agreement, memorandum of
intent, or multi-lateral convention on acid rain lies a complex interplay of
institutional, legal, political, scientific and socio-economic factors.
Understanding such factors enhances our ability to respond through
appropriate legal and institutional measures to future environmental
threats.
Brunn~e then looks in detail at the conception and development of the
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and subsequent
Montreal Protocol in Chapter VI. Given that the Convention and
Protocol represent the first example of a truly global management
approach to an environmental problem addressed by countries from a
variety of ideological and economic backgrounds, and given that the

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

bid, at p. 208.
Ibid., at p. 199.
]bid, at p. 200.
Ibid, at p. 202.
Ibid., at pp. 202-203.
Ibid, at p. 204.
Ibid, at p. 205.
Ibid
bid, at p. 206.
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agreements were reached in record time (as mentioned earlier, the
problem of ozone layer depletion was not even scientifically recognized
until 1974), it is not surprising that this approach is presented as the
prototype upon which other agreements could be patterned.
In the course of her analysis, Brunn~e reveals some of the substantive
and procedural weaknesses as well as the strengths of the Convention and
Protocol: for example, the probable insufficiency of the agreed upon CFC
reducitons, 96 and the fact that there is no mandatory procedure for
dispute settlement 97 are two continuing problems (others have gone much
98
farther in criticizing the terms of the Convention and Protocol.)
Brunn~e sets out the integral role played by UNEP in intitiating and
promoting the drafting of the agreements and also descibes the widely
diverging interests of the parties which became evident during the
negotiation phase preceding the drafting of the agreements. 99 Rifts
between the EEC and the U.S. developed over whether or not limits
should be placed on production or on consumption; 100 as well, the unique
position of developing countries, who have not been significant
contributors to the problem in the first place and did not want their
ability to develop compromised by the agreement, also had to be
recognized in the terms of the agreement.' 0 ' Interestingly, Brunn6e
attributes some of the aggressiveness in which the U.S. pursued the
negotiation of the agreement to a domestic legal action against the federal
Environmental Protection Agency.10 2 As with her evaluation of the acid
rain agreements, Brunn~e here indicates her support for the use of a
framework agreement approach to address controversial issues marked
by scientific uncertainty. 103
Throughout the book, Brunn6e compares and contrasts the differences
between acid rain and ozone depletion, and between the positions of the
developed and developing nations to good effect. As a result, the reader
gains an appreciation for how the legal form of international pollution
agreements is in large part determined by such factors as whether the
environmental problem is perceived as a regional threat (eg., acid rain) or

96. Ibid, at p. 251.
97. Ibid, at p. 235 and 267.
98. See, eg., P. Tourangeau, "The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer: Can It Keep Us All from Needing Hats, Sunglasses, and Suntan Lotions?" (1988-1989)
11 HastingsInt'l and Comp. LRev. 509, esp. at pp. 519-540.
99. Brunn6e, supra,note 2, at pp. 226-229.
100. Ibid., at pp. 240-249.
101. Ibid, at pp. 238-239.
102. Ibid, at pp. 249-250.
103. Ibid, at pp. 250-251.
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as global in nature, and whether the problem is perceived by the actions
of (and therefore primarily the responsibility of) the industrialized
nations, as opposed to that of developing states. 1°4
Although Brunn~e's account ends with discussion of events as of late
1987, the story is far from over. While the Vienna Convention entered
into force September 22, 1988, and the protocol on January 1, 1989,
some of the potentially most difficult components of the agreements have
yet to be agreed upon: for example, procedures for determining incidents
of non-compliance with Protocol terms have not yet been worked out,
nor is there yet a procedure for deciding on the treatment of noncomplying nations. On the acid rain front, U.S. President Bush's recent
Clean Air Act legislative amendment initiatives could, if they survive
Congress scrutiny intact, prove to be a major step toward Canada-U.S.
agreement on this problem.
The atmospheric pollution issue which has now moved to centre stage
in the international community is global warming. The March 11, 1989
Declaration of the Hague001 calls for the development of new institutional
authority, either by strengthening existing institutions or by creating an
institution with "new and more effective decision-making and
enforcement mechanisms" to address the global warming issue.105
Decisions of the proposed authority are to be subject to review by the
International Court of Justice at the Hague.10 7 Twenty-four nations
originally signed the declaration, and another nine signatories were
announced following a meeting in Paris on May 9-10, 1989.108
Signatories represent developed and developing countries, including
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Hungary,
Japan, India, Indonesia, Italy, the Ivory Coast, New Zealand, Senegal,
Sweden, Venezuela, West Germany and Zimbabwe.1 9 French Prime
Minister Michel Rocard is reported to have invited nations that have not
yet signed the declaration to become involved at the earliest possible
time, so as to protect their interests before the regulations and
enforcement mechanisms are finalized.110
104. On this subject, India has recently demanded that developed countries compensate it to
the tune of $2 billion to entice it to sign the ozone protocol: "India Wants $2 Billion From
Others to Sign Ozone Protocol", BNA InternationalEnvironment Reporter, August, 1989,

p. 389.
105. 12 INER 176, text reprinted in InternationalDigest of Health Legislation, 1989, 40 (3)
at pp. 122-724.
106. Ibid. preamble.

107. Ibid, principle (c).
108. Per "Meeting strengthens Hague Accord; Nine More Nations Sign Declaration", BNA
InternationalEnvironmentReporter,June, 1989, p. 287.
109. Ibid
110. Ibid
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If, in their call for an international agency with new and effective
"enforcement" mechanisms, the signatories to the Hague initiative
envisage more than simply the trade sanctions and "dispute settlement
mechanisms" in existing conventions, then it would seem self-evident that
what is being considered is the establishment of an international
environmental regime which is considerably more powerful than
anything currently in place, several steps beyond the management
approach described in the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol.
Clearly, for such an institution to materialize, nations must first agree to
relinquish significant aspects of sovereignty. In the opinion of this
reviewer, one weakness of the Brunn6e text is the apparent reluctance of
the author to explore the possibility of such a global environmental
authority (and its practical and legal implications) in the context of her
discussion of the ozone depletion management approach. Perhaps even as
late as 1987 the likelihood of a world environmental enforcement agency
seemed beyond the realm of possibility, although calls for such an entity
have been made since at least 1970."'
A final note on the general readability of the text is in order. It has
been said that a thesis or dissertation is only rarely publishable as a book,
and even more rarely as a good one. 1 2 Brunn6e's book is obviously one
of the rare successes. It is eminently readable, well organized and
thoroughly documented up to late 1987. It builds substantially on the
earlier work of van Lier." 3 There are limitations to the book: the lack of
detailed discussion of the new developments in state responsibility and
liability, lack of aggressive criticism of the ozone pact, and a failure to
explore beyond the currently used approaches to international
environmental problems. But these are inevitable deficiencies to be
expected in a text which attempts to provide an overview of the issues.
Anyone wishing to gain an understanding of this fast-developing area of
international law would be well advised to start by obtaining a copy of
this book.

Kernaghan Webb,
Lecturer, Faculty of Law,
University of Ottawa,
Consultant, Administrative Law Project,
Law Reform Commission of Canada.
11. See, eg., G. Kennan, "To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal" (1970), 48 Foreign
Affairs 401-413.
112. E. Harman and I. Montague, eds., The Thesis andthe Book Toronto: U. ofT. Press, 1978.
113. van Lier, supra, note 3.
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William C. Gilmore, Newfoundland and Dominion Status. Toronto,
Calgary, Vancouver: Carswell 1988. Pp. XX, 271. ($48.00)*
The relationship between Canada and Newfoundland was under stress
for a number of different reasons during the eighties. There was a dispute
over off-shore mineral rights' as well as concern over French fishing
rights.2 For those interested in the relationship, Dr. Gilmore's book,
Newfoundland and Dominion3 Status, subtitled The External Affairs
Competence and InternationalLaw Status of Newfoundland, 1855-1934,
therefore provides a useful historical background as well as fascinating
information about the constitutional development of Newfoundland.
This may be of interest as well to constitutional and international scholars
generally as well as to Newfoundland's neighbours in the Maritimes.
The author is aware of the practical significance of his work. For
instance, he refers to the recent disputes between the federal government
and Newfoundland over the Continental Shelf.
In February 1983, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that the
province of Newfoundland had both property rights in and legislative
jurisdiction over the mineral resources of the territorial sea to three
nautical miles from the baselines, but that the federal government and
parliament possessed the appropriate rights and powers in respect of the
Continental Shelf. In March 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada
confirmed the position of the Canadian federal authorities in relation to
the Continental Shelf. In this instance the question of the territorial sea was
excluded but may well be the subject of separate judicial consideration in
the future. In both of these constitutional references it should be noted that
in international law was
the pre-Confederation position of Newfoundland
4
directly at issue and specifically addressed.
*The reviewer would like to thank her colleagues Dianne Pothier and David Vanderzwaag for
their assistance.
1. See the Canada-NewfoundlandAtlantic Accord Implementation Ac4 S.C. 1987, c. 3. For
comments on the constitutional validity of the Atlantic Accord, see Rowland J. Harrison,
"Jurisdiction over Offshore Installations in Canada", in Ian Townsend-Gault (ed.) Offshore
Petroleum InstallationsLaw and Financing Canada and the United States, International Bar
Association, London, 1986, 39, at 67-68.
2. It is difficult to find an academic analysis of this, but see Douglas Day, "Defining Another
Canadian Maritime Boundary: St. Pierre and Miquelon Dispute Goes to International
Settlement" (1989), 7(3) The Operational Geographer 12.
3. The term "Dominion" does not have a very clear meaning. Gilmore quotes a 1930 internal
Dominions Office memorandum as stating that dominion status is not co-extensive with all
forms of responsible government. Rather it "would seem to connote a member of the British
Commonwealth of Nations separately represented at the Imperial Conference, having full
autonomy and having also a very advanced form of democratic government". P. 2. However,
Newfoundland still seemed to be formally described as "Island" or "Colony". See p. 175,
note 151.
4. Gilmore, at p. 4 (footnotes omitted). However, the pre-Confederation position was in the
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The focus of the book is on the period 1855-1934, from the
introduction of responsible government to the Commission of
Government on 16th February 1934.5 The story is one of the gradual
evolution of Newfoundland's role in external affairs, during a distinctive
period in her history. Part 1, based on extensive archival research, deals
with the shift in power from London to Newfoundland, although the
failure to seek or be granted membership in the League of Nations made
the position somewhat confused. Part 2 deals with the legal status of
Newfoundland and the question of whether it ever developed a separate
international juridical personality.
Newfoundland achieved responsible government in 1855. Gilmore
describes in Chapter 1 how in the early years of such government United
Kingdom authorities believed in "complete colonial subordination in the
field of external affairs." 6 He then traces the spheres of increasing
autonomy, however, for example, in the area of commercial treatymaking. One focus of Newfoundland pressure for more power with
respect to non-commercial treaties was on foreign fishing rights. In 1857,
the Anglo-French negotiation on French fishing rights was concluded.
The agreement was received with "considerable popular discontent" in
Newfoundland and rejected by the Council and Assembly who insisted
that "the consent of the community of Newfoundland ...[was] the
essential preliminary to any modification of their territorial or maritime
7
rights".
This show of defiance did result in some recognition of the principle of
consultation.8 Nevertheless the most important aspects of foreign policy
remained under the control of the United Kingdom. Chapter 2 deals with
the conduct of the first world war. The failure to consult the Dominions
about the declaration of war caused considerable concern and led Lloyd
George, when he formed a new government in 1916, to call a special
War Conference of the Empire. Sir E. Morris, the Prime Minister of
Newfoundland, was invited to this conference, which played a role in
sweeping aside Dominion exclusion from decisions about war and peace
and was part of a movement toward equality of status. Nevertheless,
end not a deciding factor with respect to the continental shelf. See Reference re Mineral and
Other NaturalResources of the ContinentalShelf (1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.) and
Re Seabed and Subsoil of Continental Shelf Offshore Nfld (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 385
(s.C.C.).
5. For a brief description of the status of Newfoundland during the suspension of responsible
government, see Re Seabed and Subsoil of Continental Shelf Offshore Nfld, ibid, at
pp. 403-406.
6. P. 15.

7. Gilmore cites the "Journal of the Newfoundland Assembly 1857", Appendix, p. 4 62.
8. Pp. 37-44.
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Newfoundland, unlike the other Dominions, did not have separate
representation at the Plenary Conference at the Paris Peace Conference
and did not sign the Treaty of Versailles. (It seemed that a sense was
developing that all Dominions were equal but some had more dominion
than others.) More significant than the formality of a signature however,
was Newfoundland's exclusion from original membership in the League
of Nations. This was to contribute to the complexity of Newfoundland's
status in later years, for instance, with respect to the mode of signature of
international agreements.
Chapter 3 deals with post-war constitutional developments, including
treaty-making and diplomatic representation. These were advances
consistent with the recognition of equality of status. Newfoundland was
relatively inactive in international affairs but interest continued to be
shown in fisheries as well as in international communications and the
regulation of postal matters. 9 However, it was possible for an official of
the Foreign Office to state in 1923 that:
There are two types of British Dominion status: the major type, as exists
in Canada, etc., whom the C.O. habitually consult before involving them
in international commitments; and the minor of which hitherto
Newfoundland has been unique .... l0
The Balfour Declaration, 1926, is the subject of Chapter 4, which
covers the period ending in 1934. Led by South Africa, there was a
movement in favour of full recognition of equality of status. This issue
dominated the Imperial Conference in 1926 and led to the Balfour
Declaration. Newfoundland was not particularly keen on departing from
a policy of working things out as they arose. The then Prime Minister
spoke at the Conference, noting that he attended "as the representative of
what we much prefer to call Britain's oldest colony rather than Britain's
youngest Dominion"." In the end the agreed formula on equality of
status recognised Newfoundland as equal whether she wanted to be or
not.
Nevertheless, equal or no, uncertainty continued about Newfoundland's international status. With respect to the mode of signature of
international agreements, Gilmore contrasts the view of the Dominions
Office, which was that Newfoundland should be able to sign as a separate
contracting government, with that of the Foreign Office. The latter was
that Newfoundland had no separate international status at all and was

9. Gilmore cites as an example the fact that an independent postal convention with the United
States was concluded in 1926. P. 98.
10. P. 102.
11. P. 104.
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based on lack of membership in the League of Nations. During this
period, Newfoundland showed little interest in foreign affairs although it
did create its own national flag in 1931.12 Readers who would find
pleasure in a story of the active assertion of equal status will not
experience it in this chapter. Newfoundland was evidently willing to
stand up for itself on particular issues such as fisheries, but did not value
abstract declarations of equality which may have had little practical value
given the population and resources of the island. Content to leave such
matters largely to the United Kingdom, its status remained ambiguous.
The internal constitutional position was not crystal-clear either.
Gilmore describes in Chapter 5 how the powers of reservation and
disallowance fell into disuse and were finally abandoned. The
complexities of the role of the Governor, given recognition of equal
status, are discussed, as is the power of the United Kingdom to exercise
direct legislative control. This was rarely used, although Gilmore
provides an example in 1907, also relating to fish.
In 1907 the refusal of Newfoundland to accept a modus vivendi with the
United States pending the settlement by arbitration of the issue as to
fishery rights resulted in the overriding of the local law by an Order in
Council ...passed to enable the3 Crown to carry out the terms of the
Anglo-American treaty of 1818.1
The Statute of Westminster did not exactly clarify the situation with
respect to direct legislation. Gilmore notes, on p. 170, that the Preamble,
which states the by-then conventional position of no legislation without
consent, applied to Newfoundland. However, certain operative sections,
including section 4, which gave statutory expression to the idea that no
law should be made unless at the request and with the consent of the
Dominion, did not, at Newfoundland's request, apply without
independent adopting legislation. "No steps were taken prior to the
introduction of Commission of Government in February 1934 to bring
14
these sections into force."
By the time a reader reached the analysis of whether Newfoundland
achieved statehood prior to 1934, or some lesser degree of international
personality prior to 1926, in the final chapter, she would be very wellinformed. The relevant historical events, the legal concepts, the subleties
of the issues, and their significance with respect to off-shore mineral rights
have been clearly discussed.

12. P. 103.
13. P. 160, quoting A.B. Keith, Dominion Autonomy in Practice, Oxford University Press,
London 1929, at 55. Keith called this an "extraordinary step".
14. P. 171. See generally on the Statute of Westminster, pp. 168-173.
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In Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the
Continental Shelf'y5 Newfoundland argued that it possessed sufficient
international personality to enjoy the rights of a coastal state over the
seabed and subsoil. In addition it was argued that these rights remained
with the province within the Terms of Union. Canada argued that
Newfoundland lacked the status to acquire such rights and that
Newfoundland was in much the same position as the other provinces.
Scholarly opinion varied, although there is modern support for the idea
that statehood was achieved.' 6 This view was shared by the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal. 17 Gilmore provides a closely-reasoned
argument, based to a certain extent on Canadian views of when Canada
achieved statehood, that the 1926 Balfour Declaration was the critical
date rather than the Statute of Westminster. He also stresses the voluntary
nature of the fact that Newfoundland left much of the conduct of its
external affairs in the hands of the British.18 This point can be used to
illustrate a feature of the whole book. Based on extensive archival
research, and displaying an impressive knowledge of the literature in the
various fields covered, it is not intended to address the reality of political
life in Newfoundland in the period in question. While it is an historical
book it is not that kind of history. Thus it is possible for the author to say
that Newfoundland acted voluntarily in not exercising its external affairs
powers. While convincing on a legal level, this does not enable the reader
to assess its plausibility on the level of reality. Did Newfoundland
actually have the human and economic resources to do anything else? Is
that relevant to a discussion of statehood or any lesser degree of international personality? The lack of enthusiasm with which Newfoundland
greeted declarations of equal status sought by some other Dominions
suggests that Newfoundland was not acting voluntarily in the sense of
making a choice between two feasible alternatives. However, the book
does no more than allow one to guess at this.
Gilmore reaches two conclusions. The first relates to statehood:
Although it thus constitutes the borderline case par excellence, the above
analysis suggests that by the time of the 1926 Balfour Declaration

15. (1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. C.A.).
16. P. 189, note 65.
17. However the Supreme Court of Canada stressed the effect of the Terms of Union in 1949
as well as the fact that international law on the continental shelf had not attained concrete form
in 1949 in deciding that it is Canada that has legislative jurisdiction as well as the right to
explore and exploit. See Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf
Offshore Newfoundland(1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.). Hence events prior to 1934 were
relatively insignificant.
18. P. 220.
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Newfoundland should be regarded as having satisfied the highly elastic
criteria for statehood established by international law. 19
The second, "in no way inconsistent" conclusion relates to whether
Newfoundland developed an international personality prior to 1926.
Although all the Dominions shared an equal constitutional position prior
to their achievement of statehood, their positions within the sphere of
international law differed according to the nature and diversity of the
international activities in which they in fact engaged. Viewed in this light
it is clear that in spite of the possession of an equal potential for
international action, Newfoundland obtained in law a less advanced
degree of international legal personality. 20
Here the book comes to a somewhat abrupt end.
This is an impressive and scholarly book which makes an important
contribution to filling the gap in the legal literature about Newfoundland.
It is beautifully produced 21 and elegantly written. The Carswell Co. Ltd.
is to be congratulated, as are the Law Foundation of Newfoundland and
the Government of Newfoundland for their financial support. The author
has written a fine book, which certainly justifies that support.
Christine Boyle,
Dalhousie Law School

19. P. 231.
20. P. 246.
21. The Carswell Co. Ltd. seems to have had a very uneven record over the past several years.
Other examples of their well-produced books include Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common
Law of Restraint of Trade, 1986. Compare however the second edition of Don Stuart,
Canadian Criminal Law, with its numerous typing/printing errors. Anyone negotiating a
publishing contract with Carswells should insist on the Gilmore/Trebilcock editor, if (s)he is
still available!
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Douglas M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary
Making, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 445.
$39.95 (Hardcover). ISBN 0-7735-0624-1.
Over the years, Douglas Johnston has written and edited a large body of
literature on the subject of ocean boundary making. The "functionalist"
approach to ocean boundary which he presents in this book is obviously
the result of his careful accumulation of knowledge and experience over
many years' involvement with the topic as researcher and writer. While
at Dalhousie University in Halifax he had significant and direct
involvement with the Ocean Studies Program.
"In the modem era, the world has witnessed the proliferation of coastal
and offshore zones designed chiefly for the purposes of resource
development and management, especially in the period since the end of
World War II."
Johnston's book provides a lengthy synthesis of all disciplines relevant
to ocean boundary making. The author outlines the general theory of
ocean boundary making, reviews the modem history of all modes of
ocean boundary making, and provides a theoretical framework for the
analysis and evaluation of ocean boundary claims, practices,
arrangements, and settlements. He does this in order to bring to the
attention of ocean boundary makers the contemporary "functionalist"
perspective to ocean boundary making as opposed to the pre-classical
"unitarian" perspective. In fact, the entire book urges governments of the
world to tackle ocean boundary making issues in a practical, functionalist
approach, through both boundary line settlement and ocean use
management/arrangements. The book deals with an extremely important
question which many governments around the world are now facing or
will have to face in the near future.
To that extent, Johnston's book is important not only to lawyers, but
to all governments negotiating ocean boundaries. Ocean boundary
negotiations involve a multi-disciplinary range of professionals, such as
lawyers, economists, political scientists, sociologists, fishermen, resourcespecialists, and diplomats.
Johnston discusses the different theoretical approaches to ocean
boundary making both from an internal and international negotiation
perspective. In attempting to answer all major questions which might
emerge in negotiations concerning boundary making, he quite properly
tries to place himself in the position of a government preparing itself for
the difficult task of ocean boundary negotiation.
The nature of the complexities confronting government negotiators
range from diversity of values, interests at stake, attitudes, physical
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setting, relationship of the parties, and numerous other factors, each of
which is analyzed by Johnston. He discusses and identifies different
conceptual frameworks necessary to the theory of boundary making,
using the physical, political, social-cultural, economic, juridical, and
managerial frameworks.
Johnston's book makes a distinction between ocean regime and ocean
zones in discussing the history of ocean boundary making. In so doing, he
reaches the conclusion that the history of public law and administration
of the oceans has been one of more or less continuous confusion between
two rival modes of thought about the distribution and administration of
authority over the ocean. He sees the tension between regime and zones
as reflecting the need for accommodation between general theory and
specific practical requirements. Therefore, he goes on, what is important
in the contemporary period is to find innovative ways of reconciling the
general with the specific, and the theoretical with the practical. He
believes that the only way to resolve this tension is to adopt a
functionalist approach both to the concept of maritime jurisdiction and to
the theory of ocean boundary making. The adoption of articles 74(1) and
83(1) at UNCLOS 111 has already accomplished this to some extent. He
gives examples of, inter alia, the new definition of the continental shelf
under article 76 of the new Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, and the
multi-functional regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone.
The author further observes that the history of ocean boundary making
has been the story of the emergence of ocean technology, i.e., of the
evolution of the science and technology of location and measurement at
sea. He reviews the history of physical geography, geodesy, cartography
and hydrography, and of related disciplines and techniques of location,
measurement, and related forms of investigation. The author attempts to
bridge the gap between the law of ocean boundary making and the
physical geography of the oceans, as a prerequisite to his examination of
the modern legal, political and diplomatic history of ocean boundary
making.
Johnston's book underscores the point that most of the contemporary
rules of ocean boundary making are the product of the neo-classical
period (emphasizing the functionalist approach to boundary making)
rather than the current "romantic" period of legal development
emanating from conference diplomacy. As a result, throughout his
analysis, the author makes a clear theoretical and historical distinction
between determination of seaward limits, delineation of baselines and
closing lines, and delimitation of "lateral" ocean boundaries.
Johnston explores at length, though with some difficulty, the
functionalist approach to adjudication as it is applied in ocean boundary
delimitation settlement (80 pages). He has been a little unfair in the
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treatment of the same subject in state practice as it pertains to
delimitation agreements (only 9 pages). It is an acknowledged fact that
the inter-disciplinary/functionalist approach to ocean boundary making
evolved through state practice in the form of treaty-making. Despite this
fact, the author opted to discuss the importance of state practice in a
cursory manner. He only makes reference to a generalized trend or
pattern observed in the delimitation treaties concluded between states,
without going further into detailed discussion of several treaties which
have settled ocean borders in an inter-disciplinary manner.
For the functionalist approach advocated by Johnston to be successful,
neighbouring coastal states need to have the same ocean management
policies. Without identical management policies, it might be difficult for
such states to cooperate in their ocean management arrangements.
However, notwithstanding these difficulties, coastal states could, with
determination, very well approach their ocean boundary making in a
more practical, inter-disciplinary way.
The present reviewer would have liked to have been told more about
the experiences of states that have approached boundary settlement from
a functionalist perspective rather than the "unitarian" perspective, which
the author discourages, though the latter approach is still emphasized by
the majority of the judges involved in the adjudication process.
Furthermore, theories have normally been built out of practice. Though
the author acknowledges that fact, he does not give the ocean boundary
negotiators specific instances where those theories have been built from.
Does it mean that ocean boundary makers have to assume that every
delimitation agreement looked at will have passed all the stages discussed
in Chapter 13?
Notwithstanding these minor shortcomings, this book is to be warmly
welcomed as a major contribution to international scholarship and as a
basic authority for contemporary ocean boundary negotiators. It is full of
stimulating, detailed, historical analysis of ocean boundary making from
the pre-classical era to the present and in its analysis and recommendations it goes far beyond the existing literature which, with few exceptions,
is limited to discussions of either the adjudication process to ocean
boundary settlement or delimitation treaties concluded by states in
specific oceanographic regions. This outstanding book is for generalist
and specialist alike.
Elizabeth Maruma Mrema,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania.
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Nigel Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987. ISBN 0-19-825563-2.
Pbk. xxii + 374 pp. $44.95.
As Legal Adviser to Amnesty International, Mr. Rodley is well aware of
the numerous occasions on which prisoners and detainees in a variety of
countries suffer inhumane treatment, often involving torture or even
death. As a contribution to the UNESCO series New Challenges in
International Law he has produced this study of The Treatment of
Prisonersunder InternationalLaw seeking to show the extent to which
international legal regulation attempts to protect such persons, either by
way of the general rules concerning human rights or by way of specific
regulations and studies carried out under the auspices of international
organizations.
For the purpose of his analysis, Mr. Rodley defines prisoners or
detainees as "any persons who are so positioned as to be unable to
remove themselves from the orbit of official action and abuse" (p. 5).
One of the accusations constantly made against those holding such
persons is that they employ torture against them, and torture is defined as
"officially sanctioned infliction of intense suffering, aimed at forcing
someone to do or say something against his will.., it has also become a
method of inspiring fear among the population at large, or specific
segments of it" (p. 7). That the idea of torture is in fact highly subjective
may be seen from the case before the European Court of Human Rights
lodged by Ireland against the United Kingdom concerning the treatment
of detainees in Ulster (pp. 83-6). The author points out that in many
instances the typical victim of torture is the "political opponent of the
government - violent or non-violent, a real force for change or a minor
irritant to the regime - seized by the security forces [who] may be
military or police" (p. 9), and frequently such persons 'disappear', a
matter carefully examined by the author in chapter 8 of the book. Other
chapters deal with extra-legal executions (6), the death penalty, an issue
that is a major item in Amnesty's programme (7), the actual conditions
of imprisonment or detention (9), corporal punishment (10), and
guarantees against arbitrary arrest and detention (11).
Of late, the United Nations has itself become concerned with the
treatment of detainees and has proposed a Code for Law Enforcement
Officers and set out Principles of Medical Ethics, while the Council of
Europe has produced a Declaration on the Police seeking to prevent
abuses by such persons. These codes of ethics are examined in chapter 12.
While it is true that they have no legal force of their own (p. 222), the
codes do serve as guidelines and some countries have instructed their
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forces to follow them in practice. Insofar as the medical code is
concerned, while one understands the attitude of such bodies as the
World Medical Association in instructing doctors not to participate in
corporal or capital punishment (p. 297), one cannot help but enquire
whether the medical profession would prefer that, for example, lethal
injections be administered by completely unqualified persons, or that
doctors should really refuse to state whether a person is fit to undergo
corporal punishment or when the infliction of such would result in death,
and should judicially-ordained amputations be carried out and treated by
'butchers'?
Prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory fall within Mr.
Rodley's definition. However, since such persons are protected by the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols supplemental
thereto, the regime relating to them is lex specialis and it is dangerous to
attempt to derive therefrom general principles applicable to the world at
large, for these documents are directed to protecting non-nationals in the
hands of an adverse party. Nevertheless, the author constantly indulges in
such generalization, even to the extent of seeming to imply that there is
some connection between both the UN Code of Law Enforcement
Officers and the European Code with humanitarian law in wartime
(p. 290). The Geneva Conventions have no application when the military
are carrying out a police function. Similarly, the fact that these
Conventions or the Protocols forbid certain activities, or even treat them
as crimes, does not mean that this supports the contention that this is
evidence of 'general international law', regardless of whether they
replicate moral bans to be found in General Assembly Resolutions or
similar non-binding documents (see pp. 232-3, 247-8,269, etc.). At the
same time, one might question the assertion that "where a right is nonderogable ...
, this is evidence that it is recognized by general
international law as carrying universal obligation, regardless of whether
or not a state is party to one of the treaties containing it" (p. 200).
One must also question the correctness of other comments concerning
armed conflict law in The Treatment of Prisoners under International
Law. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not "deal only with crimes against
humanity committed after the outbreak of international warfar (that is,
after 1939)" (pp. 100-1). While it refused to consider the Nazi antiJewish legislation as such, it did regard as criminal and within its
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity such actions as might be
considered part and parcel of the planning of aggressive war and took as
its date a quo the Kristallnachtatrocity of November 1938. Nor can it be
said that the Geneva Conventions "encompass a codification of war
crimes" (p. 101). They merely indicate that certain acts are to be treated
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as 'grave breaches' and do not go as far, for example, as the lists to be
found in Nuremberg Charter or the Canadian war crimes legislation. It is
also somewhat strange to find the statement that by virtue of the
Genocide Convention, "'crimes against humanity' ... form a specific
category of 'crimes under international law', namely that comprising acts
committed in connection with war crimes or crimes against peace"
(p. 101). This reads strangely in the light of the Canadian legislation, and
Mr. Rodley recognizes that difficulties arise because of the Apartheid
Convention which condemns such practices as crimes against humanity.
It is somewhat in the nature of special pleading to read that while "[t]his
could be taken as suggesting that the term is no longer restricted to acts
committed in connection with international hostilities[, i]t might be more
satisfactorily explained by the practice of UN organs, especially the
General Assembly, to treat the situation in South Africa as one
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security" (p. 101,
n. 23). Moreover, this comment ignores the fact that the Convention is
general in its terms, the sole reference to South Africa is in Article II,
stating that "the term 'the crime of apartheid', which shall include similar
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised
in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial
group or persons over any other racial group of persons and
systematically oppressing them.... Similarly, it is questionable whether,
in view of the jurisdictional provision in the Genocide Convention,
individual perpetrators of genocide are "probably liable to trial on the
basis of universal jurisdiction" (p. 164).
Regardless of these criticisms, there is much in the book that is
valuable and this is particularly the case with the accounts of the activities
of the UN Commission and Committee of Human Rights, even though
they may do little more than expose a situation and make recommendations (see ch. 1 and 5). However, it is difficult to agree that statements
made by representatives at international congresses, especially when there
is no official record, "can be interpreted as authentic expressions of their
law enforcement policies" (p. 33). But it is refreshing to be reminded,
especially when the new regime in Romania is lodging charges of
genocide against those alleged to have been involved in suppressing the
revolt, that this offence is essentially directed against persons as members
of a 'group' because they are such members and with the intention of
destroying the group (pp. 53-4). However, one must tread warily in
seeking to describe asjus cogens 'rules' which are drawn from one or two
conventions even though they are intended to give effect to the principles
laid down in the Universal declaration of Human Rights. If this were true
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in regard, for example, to torture, one might question the need for a
convention or any suggestion that non-parties were bound by the ban
(p. 70), and it is far too early to put forward in support of this contention
the somewhat unique US decision in Filartigav. Pena-Irala(pp. 104-6).
Perhaps one of the reasons that the United States has not yet become a
party to the American Convention and Court of Human Rights lies in the
provision that capital punishment is not to be imposed on anyone under
18 or over 70 (pp. 186-7). One has some sympathy with the author's
view that it is somewhat "[b]izarre that corporal punishment may well
fall foul of the prohibition [against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment], while capital punishment apparently does not" (p. 166).
But is it correct to assert that "there is weighty evidence to suggest that
[corporal punishment] is illegal under human rights law" (p. 242)?
There is much discussion in Canada concerning the use of firearms by
the police. It is of interest to note that by the Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officers, "In general, firearms should not be used except
when a suspect offender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes
the lives of officers and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain
or apprehend the suspect offender" (pp. 150-1, 351). This leads one to
question how often it would be permissible to fire at a speeding vehicle.
Although the reviewer doubts whether the fact that "the [International]
Covenant and at least two of the regional human rights conventions have
... elements in common is strong evidence that they express a rule of
general international law" (p. 269), he agrees fully that "once it is
recognized that, as with the interpretation of constitutional bills or rights,
the content and scope of the rights guaranteed [by, for example, the
European Convention] will evolve with the changing standards of
society, it has to follow that there will be an element of apparent
arbitrariness in a judicial finding that what was not prohibited at one
stage has subsequently become so" (p. 251). In the light of this statement,
it may well be that, as society evolves, many of the statements in The
Treatment of Prisoners under International Law now considered
questionable will in fact be found to be precursors of generally accepted
international law.
L.C. Green,
University Professor,
University of Alberta.
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